Former research at the Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
identified peace building leadership as one of the necessary building blocks of
sustainable peace building. Looking at a conflict, one can hardly ever complain
about the lack of leadership. Yet, the influence of peace builders on the peace
process is sometimes weak or nonexistent. Be it because of the absence of peace
building leadership, or the lack of power and influence of these people. In this
article, a first attempt is made to distinguish peace building from peace spoiling
leadership.

**Luc Reychler** is professor at the University of Leuven and director of the
Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies.

**Anton Stellamans** is a research assistant at the Center for Peace Research and
Strategic Studies at the University of Leuven.

# PEACE BUILDING LEADERS AND SPOILERS

## Luc Reychler
## Anton Stellamans

The Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies (Centrum voor Vredesonderzoek en Strategische Studies) was established in the Department of Political Science of the University of Leuven in 1983. The last five years research has been focused on: conflict prevention, missed opportunities of lateral intervention, democratic peace building, field diplomacy, conflict impact assessment and peace architecture. CPRS output appears in journals, books and in the Cahiers of the Centre for Peace Research.

# PEACE BUILDING LEADERS AND SPOILERS

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## Content:

# Peace building leaders and spoilers[1]

## 1. Introduction

This paper has been urged by:

- the conclusions of an ongoing study of sustainable peace building. In distilling the necessary pre conditions for sustainable peace, it becomes clear that a critical mass of peace building leadership (PBL) is needed to create and sustain a peace building process. 2

- a request to design a course for leadership in Cameroon. The request to organize a leadership course for developing and transition countries was appealing and makes lots of sense. But when I asked people how they thought about such training I got some surprising answers. A Congolese respondent replied that the Democratic Republic of Congo has plenty of good leaders and that there is no need education or training, but support. In contrast Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's founding president, stated that the mess in Sub-Saharan Africa is made by its leaders. Where visionary leadership lifted Asia out of poverty since the 1960's, too many African leaders in the same period presided over massive declines in African standards of living while enriching themselves and their cronies[3]. Others responded more enthusiastically, but were not sure about the content and the method of such training. Still others responded that we should organize high level self-help workshops for advisors of leaders in transition countries, where they could discuss common problems and share experiences. (Workshops for Transition Leadership).

- the ongoing media wars in the Middle East, labelling some leaders as peace makers and others as spoilers. The conflict in the Middle East has been turned into a huge media event, in which one party is being

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[1] This paper has been presented at the International Peace Research Association Conference on "Globalization, Governance and Social Justice: New Challenges for Peace Research", at the Kyung Hee University in Suwon, South-Korea, July 1-5, 2002. Commission: "Conflict Resolution and Peace Building".

[2] See also John Stoessinger, Why nations go to war ( fifth edition),1990, St. Martins' Press, New York; Luc Reychler , Peace architecture, a paper for the festschrift for Professor Herbert Kelman , 2000, Harvard University, Cambridge; Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (Eds.) Peace building: a field guide, 2000, Lynne Rienner, Boulder , Colorado.

[3] Robert Rotberg, Africa's mess, Mugabe's Mayhem, in Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2000, pp.47-61.

stigmatized as belonging to the civilized world and as a peace maker, and the other as a total spoiler. In conflicts, especially protracted ones, it is very difficult to distinguish good from bad peace makers; or good and bad spoilers.

- the weak appeal of the image of peace and of peace builders. Peace continues to have an image problem. This is partially caused by the fact that great peace builders, such as Gandhi or Mandela, have been made into icons; and consequentially turned into unreachable role models. In other sectors, such as the military and business, more attention is being paid to leadership and leadership education and training. Leadership is being associated with progress, professionalism, vision, courage and other appealing attributes. This is still not the case with peace building leadership.

The aim of the paper is (a) to distinguish different types of leadership in transition countries, (b) to identify the main characteristics of peace building leadership, (c) to make an inventory of ways and means to empower PBL, and (d) to promote more research about peace building leadership.

## Assumptions underlying this paper:

a critical mass of PB leadership is necessary for a successful transition,

PBL leaders differ from other types of leaders

PBL leadership is situated in different domains and at different levels,

leadership is not something one is born with, but to a great extent the result of qualities, experiences and learning

leaders are selected

in different phases of a conflict, different types of leaders tend to flourish[4],

the strategies of PBL are adapted to the challenges they are confronted with in different phases of the conflict.

## 2. Leadership in transition countries

### 2.1. Leadership in different domains and on different levels

There are leaders in different domains: politics, diplomacy, defence, economics, education, media, religion, health, etc. Leadership can be

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[4] See William Zartman (Ed.) Elusive Peace, 1995, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

situated at different levels: the elite, middle and grass root level[5]. The top level comprises the key political and military leaders in the conflict. These people are the highest representative leaders of the government and opposition movements, or they present themselves as such. The middle-range leaders are not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority or structures of the major opposition movements. They could be highly respected individuals or persons who occupy formal positions of leadership in sectors such as education, business, religion, agriculture, health, or humanitarian organizations. The grassroots leaders include people who are involved in local communities, members of indigenous nongovernmental organizations carrying out relief projects for local populations, health officials, and refugee camp leaders. Finally, there are external and internal leaders.

## 2.2. Peace builders and spoilers

Three types of peace builders and spoilers can be distinguished:

A. Peace building leadership

1. Non violent peace builders are leaders who did not use violence in the peace building process. (Mohandas Gandhi, Aung San Suu Kyi).

2. Peace builders who allowed a minimal amount of violence (Nelson Mandela).

3. Peace builders who used considerable violence (Abraham Lincoln). Although violence was used during the civil war the goals differed considerably from other leaders in war. A thought experiment makes the point: If you were on the losing side of civil war, would you rather surrender to surrender to Abraham Lincoln or to Hafez al Assad, to Nelson Mandela or to Mao Zedong?[6]

B Spoilers

1. Spoilers

2. Exclusive peace makers (Hitler, Stalin, Mao..).

3. Passive spoilers who fuel conflicts because of neglect, corruption, ignorance or stupidity (Mobutu, Military regime in Nigeria). Most of

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[5] See John Paul Lederach, Building peace, 1997, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.

[6] See Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler problems in peace processes, in International security, Vol.22,No.2 (Fall 1997),pp.5-53.

today's violence is committed by the latter group. This is "un-intentional violence".

## 3. Stephen Stedman's spoilers

Stephen Stedman has drawn the attention to the problem of spoilers. He considered spoilers as the greatest source of risk in the peace process. They are leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. Spoilers are distinguished from combatants in war (rebels, bandits, pariahs, rogues, or terrorists). Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Peace processes create spoilers, because it is rare that all leaders see peace as beneficial. Different types of spoiler problems can be distinguished.

### - Insider or outsider spoilers

Spoilers can be inside or outside the peace process. An inside spoiler signs the peace agreement, signals a willingness to implement a settlement, and yet fails to fulfil key obligations to the agreement. For example, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia which signed the Paris Peace Accords then refused to demobilize its soldiers and chose to boycott the elections. Inside spoilers tend to use strategies of stealth. Outside spoilers are parties who are excluded from the peace process or who exclude themselves, and use violence to attack the peace process, such as the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) in Rwanda, which committed genocide to prevent the implementation of the Arusha Accords.

### - Number of spoilers

The presence of more than one spoiler creates a compound challenge for the custodians of peace. Any pressure on one effects another. Actions taken to weaken one, may strengthen the other. The UN peace strategy in Rwanda succeeded in pressuring Habyarimana, but embolded the CDR to attack the peace process.

### - Degree of spoiling the peace process

Stedman distinguishes limited, greedy and total spoilers. These types differ primarily on the goals that the spoilers pursue and in the second place on their commitment to achieve these goals. Limited spoilers have limited goals, such as recognition and redress of grievances, a share of power or

the security of the members. Limited goals do not imply limited commitment. They can be nonnegotiable and subject to heavy sacrifice. Total spoilers are led by persons who see the world in all or nothing terms and often suffer from pathological tendencies that prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of conflict. Total spoilers often espouse radical ideologies; total power is a means for achieving such goals as the violent transformation of the society. Greedy spoilers lie between the two extremes and hold goals that expand or contract based on calculations of costs and risks. Depending on these calculations his goals may expand or contract. Greedy spoilers can be accommodated in peace processes if their limited goals are met and high costs constrain them from making added demands.

### - Locus of the spoiler problem: the leaders or followers.

A negotiated settlement to Zimbabwe's civil war became possible when Abel Muzorewa replaced Ian Smith as leader. In Rwanda, Habyarimana was reluctant to fulfil his commitments to Arusha Accords for fear that his followers would attack him.

The three major strategies in coping with spoilers range from conciliation to coercion: inducement, socialization and coercion. *Inducement* entails taking positive measures to satisfy the grievances or demands of the factions who obstruct the democratization process. These grievances can be based on the perception of fear, being unfairly treated or not respected. To reduce these grievances the mediator can, for instance, provide more protection, assure more benefits or raise the legitimacy status of the spoiler. *Socialization* aims to change the behaviour of the spoiler to adhere to the democratic norms and rules of the game. This can be done by carefully calibrating the supply of carrots and sticks to reward or punish the spoiler and by regularly persuading them of the value of the desired normative behaviour. *Coercion* relies on the use or threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable behaviour and to reduce the capability of the spoiler to disrupt the democratization process.

Among the instruments used for coercion are coercive diplomacy (air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in 1995), and the so-called 'departing train' and 'withdrawal' strategies. The departing train strategy considers the demands and behaviour of the spoiler illegitimate and decides that the democratic peace-building process will go irrevocably forward regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not. In Cambodia the strategy was linked to holding an election, thereby setting a deadline for joining the process. The

withdrawal strategy assumes that the spoiler wants an international presence during the process; the strategy aims to punish the spoiler by threatening to withdraw international support and peacekeepers during the process. This strategy was pursued by the United Nations in Rwanda and the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. A correct diagnosis of the type of spoiler is necessary for the selection of the appropriate strategy. "Total spoilers cannot be accommodated in a peace settlement; they must be defeated or so marginalized that they can do little damage. A greedy spoiler with total goals can conceivable be brought into the settlement if the costs of war are sufficiently high. Meeting its nonnegotiable demands can accommodate a limited spoiler. A greedy limited spoiler may be accommodated, but such accommodation may whet its appetite to demand more concessions".[7]

Despite the usefulness of identifying and managing spoilers, one should be aware of the problems related to it. First, exists the possibility of political (mis) use and of labelling an opponent as a spoiler, when the latter does not approve the peace you like to implement. There is also a problem with the definition of a spoiler as someone, who disturbs the peace process, after two warring parties have committed themselves to a pact. What about a conflict with more warring parties and some important were not included in the peace process? A third problem relates to the diagnosis of the type of spoiler one is confronted with. Stedman mentions several blinders which can contribute to a poor analysis. Prior commitments between individual states and spoilers inhibited a correct interpretation of the intention and the behaviour of the spoiler (The relation between the U.S. government and Savimbi in Angola). The conceptions that mediators have of their roles can blind them for the fact that you cannot negotiate everything and with everybody. They tend to seek out evidence that confirms the basic willingness of the parties to still reach an agreement and to ignore compelling evidence that suggest one of the parties may reject peace completely.

## 4. Exercise: Who are the peace makers/ builders and the spoilers in the Middle East?

It is easy to stick labels to leaders. Mediators who intend to facilitate sustainable peace building, should be careful not to be trapped by categories. They should make a good analysis and try to understand the behaviour of the parties involved, in order to prevent any premature

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[7] Stephen Stedman, op cit. p. 9.

cognitive commitment. This is not easy. A look at the discourse in the Middle East illustrates this. Who are the spoilers and the peace builders: Arafat, Sharon, Bush, The Europeans, …?

| Strong voices | Weak voices |
| --- | --- |
| Terrorism is the greatest threat in the world. | Terrorism kills people. It is terrible. However, both the suicide actions of the Palestinians and the conventional and security forces of the Israelis sow terror and kill innocent people; the latter significantly more than the former. Israel has more than four thousand tanks and hundreds of fighter planes and attack helicopters; Palestine has none. |
| Arafat is a terrorist. You have to neutralize him and not invite at the negotiation table. | Arafat may be a terrorist, but many leaders such as Mandela, who fought against colonialism or apartheid, were once stigmatized as terrorists. The English called the father of America, George Washington, a terrorist. |
| There will be peace, when these terrorists are eliminated. | Yes an end should be made to the use of all violence, including terrorism. Some of the terrorists we don't have to kill; they committed suicide. We should think about this. These acts were committed by normal youngsters living in abnormal circumstances. They consider terrorism not as a criminal act, but as legitimate means to draw attention to an unjust situation and to pressure the international community to do something about it. Killing the messenger does not kill the message. Terrorism flourishes best in an environment characterized by injustice, disrespect and despair. |
| The Palestinians should be transferred to other places (Former minister of tourism and General Eitan).The ones who stay should get no vote and no army. This is land given to us by God. 46% of the Israelis favour this solution. | This is sad. I understand that on both sides, fear is closing minds. Worse is, that that fear is exploited by a group of Revisionist Zionist politicians who believe in the "iron wall" solution. The underlying assumption is: "Every indigenous people will resist alien settlers as long as they see any hope of ridding |

| | themselves of the danger of foreign settlement. That is how Arabs will behave and go on behaving so long as they possess any gleam of hope that they can prevent ' Palestine' from becoming the land of Israel. Jews had to impose an iron wall of military force to impose their will on the Palestinians that would result in some form of political autonomy for them inside a Jewish state"[8]. This kind of talk would not be acceptable in today's Europe, except parts of ex –Yugoslavia and in extreme rightist circles. |
|---|---|
| Sharon is a man of peace (Bush)[9]. | The peace Sharon (Pax Sharon) pursues is the cause of war. He wants to destroy the monster of terrorism, he helps to create. He wishes a peace without an enemy; this means a dead enemy. A real peace builder does not destroy the enemy, but makes him to an ally. |
| The violent acts committed by the Palestinians are an expression of the much larger danger of Islam fundamentalism. | This is not a religious conflict. There may be some linkage between Islam fundamentalist and Palestinian violence, but the linkage is misused to take the attention away from the real causes of the conflict. It is also a ploy to get support from rightist politicians and American Christian fundamentalists. |
| The conflict is a battle between the civilized and the uncivilized world. | Not everybody sees it in this way. The ones who do, tend to forget the past of the civilized world and their not always civilized foreign policy. |
| During the Clinton presidency, Barak offered a generous peace proposal that satisfied 97 percent of the demands made by the Palestinians. They refused it. | Yes progress had been made, but the perception of generosity was Barak's. A great deal of analysts did not see the peace proposal as a present. Someone compared it to getting back 97 percent of your body, but with separated limbs and only half of your brains. |

[8] Charles Hauss, International conflict resolution, 2001, Continuum, London, p.139.
[9] Quoted in the Washington Post on Friday, April 19, 2002; Page A01.

| The Palestinians should first make an end to the violence, and than we will negotiate. | Palestinians linger for peace. A lasting cease fire however is only possible when there is a future perspective. |
|---|---|
| The Palestinian government is not trustworthy. After the Oslo agreement they started the second intifada and killed more than 250 Israelis. | Yes, this is true. But what about the doubling of the number of Israeli colonists after the Oslo agreement. In addition the application of the principle "ten eyes for an eye" does not enhance a peace process. |
| Jenin was a centre of terrorism; a couple of dozen people were killed and the Palestinians did everything to depict it as a massacre. | The truth will come out. It is a pity that the Israeli government did not allow the UN fact finding commission to find the truth. |
| The Europeans who do not support us are anti-Semites and have forgotten the Holocaust. | Yes there are anti-Semites in Europe, but there are also in other places, as in Israel. Someone, who reminded his audience about the fact the Palestinians are also Semites, listed Sharon among the top ten anti- Semites in the world. The problem with this accusation is that it aims to shut up any criticism, including that of pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian people. What is most disturbing in the reference to the Holocaust is the misuse of the victims to legitimize a derailed policy. |

## 5. Characteristics of peace building leadership

In this part of the paper a number of hypotheses are listed, which will be validated by means of a comparative study of people which are considered as peace builders. These hypotheses concern:

- the way they handle the future and deal with the past
- focus on weaknesses and/or strengths of the society
- the peace building process
- the peace building stones they consider essential.
- their mindset
- the major ethical concerns
- their personal characteristics

| Sustainable peace building leadership | Peace spoiling leadership |
|---|---|
| **Handling of the future – dealing with the past** | |
| 1.They attach a great importance to the future and succeed in projecting a clear and compelling common future for all who want to cooperate. The future is depicted as a win-win situation. They are realistic dreamers. | Project a clear and compelling future for an exclusive group of people; the chosen ones. |
| 2.They believe that the past should not be forgotten and be dealt with in a way that heals and restores the vitality of the society. This implies balancing or reconciling competing values, such as truth, justice, security, compensation, development, mercy.. | They believe that the past should be forgotten or not forgotten and revenged. They tend to prioritize values, such as of security, development.. |
| **Focus on weaknesses-strengths** | |
| 3.A great deal of attention is being paid to the discovery and the highlighting of actual and potential strengths of the society, on which to build the new future. | They tend to be mesmerized by the past and the problems. They try to exploit the weaknesses in order to build their own power. |
| **Peace process** | |
| 4. Peace building is considered an inclusive, equal and transparent process; the work of many. A hero is not someone who has killed an enemy, but has made him/her an ally. "There is a willingness to play with or use the disloyal opposition, revolutionary extremists or putchists against other forces or institutions, to blackmail them or gain power. Semi-loyal oppositions have been more crucial in the breakdown of democracy than openly disloyal oppositions"[10]. | People who are not with us are against us. Extremists and radicals should be excluded or eliminated |
| 5.They prefer interest based conflict | They tend to opt for power based |

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[10] J. Linz, Some thoughts on the victory and future of democracy, in A. Hadenius ( Ed.), op.cit., p.421.

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| management, above right and might type of approaches. They believe that the (expected) satisfaction of human needs / rights / interests is the prime source for committing people to the peace building process. They try to comprehend (understand) people they deal with. Beneath their attitudes and positions a peace builder will find needs, desires and feelings he can understand and appreciate[11]. Cost –benefits assessments are used to commit the stakeholders to the PB process. | management of conflicts and tend to overestimate the benefits and usefulness of military power. |
| 6.They challenge the status quo. They know that constructive confrontation is necessary; they expose the existing conflict and violence; they challenge senti-mental walls which stand in the way of peace building; they are rule breakers. | They build and reinforce senti-mental walls, such as negative stereotypes, hate and fear. |
| 7. They try to develop good relations with external partners. They attach a great importance to the development of multilateral cooperation. | They prefer unilateralism and alliances which they dominate. |
| 8. They consider time as a key factor in the peace building process; time makes the difference between life and death. They opt for realistic time frames. They know that democratic peace building is a gradual, messy, fitful, and slow. | |
| **Essential peace building blocks** | |
| 9. Peace building necessitates efforts of many in different domains, at different layers. It requires the establishment of effective communication, consultation negotiation systems; democratic political structures; economic structures which enhance entrepreneurship and provide a safety net for the unfortunate; an integrative climate, security assurance, multilateral cooperation, and the development of PBL | |

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[11] Michael Briand, Practical politics,

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| in different domains and at different levels. | |
| 10.They believe that peace building efforts need to be consolidated with peace reinforcing structures, such as democracy, social free market, and security. | They agree but they prefer authoritarian political structures and centralized or pure free market economies. |
| 11. They are careful in the economic transformation process. Structural adjustment and economic liberalization policies should be customized to meet the particular needs of the war scattered states. Reconstruction and rapid growth takes precedence over rapid disinflation in the immediate post conflict period. Resources are devoted to alleviate the destabilizing effects of increased poverty and widening economic inequalities.[12]. They favour an economic system which favours entrepreneurship and a minimum of social security. They know that one can forget sustainable development, if no serious efforts are made for peace building | |
| 12. They are careful in the creation of a democracy. With respect to democratic transition, they prefer a gradual and controlled process of democratization; use the time leading up to the elections to promote citizen organizations that cut across the cleavages; the support electoral rules that reward moderation; before liberalizing the media in a war scattered state the build mechanisms that limit the promulgation of inflammatory propaganda, including ethnic 'hate media [13']. They favour of installing a democratic system. | |

[12] Roland Paris, op cit. p.89 « ..scrimping on peace building is a false economy if fighting resumes, because operations have failed to create conditions for a durable peace ».
[13] Roland Paris, Peace building and the limits of liberal internationalism, in International Security, Fall 1997, Vol 22, No 2. pp.54-89.

| | |
|---|---|
| 13. The try to dismantle the senti-mental walls which inhibit peace building. | |
| 14. They consider the development of a network of PBL very important. | Peace spoilers shun working with other leaders, which they perceive as rivals for followers, resources and state power. |
| Mindset | |
| 15. Their strategy is flexible and adapted to the demands of the changing environment. Their tolerance of uncertainty is high. They know that the fog of peace and frictions in the peace building process are caused by the inability to forecast external events, but above all by the indeterminacy of events brought about by intelligent and resourceful opposition. They are not ideologists. Theories are considered an aid to judgment, and judgment must always be free to determine whether or not they are suitable. They creatively search for alternatives; and select different approaches in different phases of the conflict. | They rely strongly on doctrines, theories, ideologies. |
| 16.They have accepted to live with the creative tension between layers of polarities, paradoxes, perplexing contradictions, and difficult ethical questions | Peace spoilers can be considered less complex and flexible thinkers, and less tolerant of uncertainty. |
| Use of force | |
| 17. They are convinced that sustainable peace cannot be achieved by means of force. However, they do not exclude its use in certain situations (for example to force the attention to an unjust situation; to pressure for change; and to defend democratic achievements. Moral force is considered an important asset in the pursuit of peace building. "They tend to disapprove of illegal violence against enemies of the | They regard an aggressive war as a positive good or justified to achieve their own interests. |

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|---|---|
| state or democracy, even when a majority of the people are willing to condone it"[14]. | |
| 18. They favour arms control measures and the creation of regional security communities. | |
| **Ethical concerns** | |
| 19. They are realists. Have no illusions. The expect to encounter obstacles and resistance. Accepting that difficulties are inevitable, and that they can't always be fully overcome, will let them work without getting discouraged. | They are traditional realists who believe in the primacy of power. |
| 20. They appeal to ethics and spirituality and use a mix of "Gesinnungsethik" and "Verantwortungsethik"; considering not only the intentions, but also the outcome. | |
| 21. They carefully deliberate or weigh the considerations –the motivating beliefs, supporting reasons, and values- that underlie the different views that people hold with respect to the matter of public concern you are discussing. Recognize that whatever you decide to do there will be an up side and a down side. | |
| 22. Peace is defined as more than the absence of physical violence. | |
| 23. The use a broad definition of violence (physical, structural, psychological, environmental and cultural violence). | |
| 24. They pay a great deal of attention to security at the individual level (human security). | |
| **Personal characteristics** | |
| 25 They see themselves as servants / stewards/ facilitators /mentors and above all | |

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|---|---|
| listeners. | |
| 26. They are a different kind of populists we are used to; They use emotions for mobilizing people to build peace, rather than for destruction. | They are populists who use emotions of the people for their own benefits. |
| 27. They have a great deal of personal integrity.\n\nCorruption and the use of power for private or personal end, is limited. They are people with honour, boldness, perseverance and self-control. | |
| 28. They are courageous men and women; encouraging other people. They risk their lives and careers. | |
| 29. They are trust builders. | They use 'fear or terror' to rally people around their flag. |
| 30. Politics is a vocation and less a way of making a living. | |
| 31. Imagine themselves as capable actors, not just a powerless victims of the violence and inequity all around you. | |

[14] J. Linz, op cit.

## 6. Comparing peace builders

| Nelso  Mandela | Jean Monnet |
|---|---|
| Handling the future – dealing with the past | |
| 1. Future | |
| Mandela's future perspective was clear: a unitary state without homelands and a non-racial democracy.<br><br>"We wanted people to vote for the ANC not simply because we had fought apartheid for eighty years, but because we were best qualified to bring about the kind of South Africa they hoped to live in. I felt that our campaign should be about the future, not the past."[i]<br><br>"I would not mince words about the horrors of apartheid, but I said, over and over, that we should forget the past and concentrate on building a better future for all."[ii] | The message of Jean Monnet was simple : in stead of engaging in an endless discussions on who was to blame for the tragedy of the second World War, all nations should gather round their common interest work together in order to build a free and wealthy Europe.[iii] His goal was the « preparation of the future ».[iv]<br><br>« The sovereign nations of the past no longer make up the frame wherein we can solve the problems of today. And the [European] Community in itself is nothing more than a stage in the development of the world of tomorrow. »[v] |
| 2.Past | |
| Certainly the most impressive feature of Mandela, was his power to forgive. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was but one of the efforts to heal the wounds of the past. After his release from prison Mandela invited the wives and widows of former black and white leaders, visited the widow of President Verwoerd, visited his grave, reconciled with guards and directors of prisons, made peace with the Afrikaner Churches who had preached and justified the fundamentals of apartheid, etc. He was determined on the need to reconcile in order to build a unitary future.<br><br>"We don't need to remind ourselves about past evil, courageous people do not fear forgiving, for the sake of peace."[vi]<br><br>"We call on those, who out of ignorance, have collaborated with apartheid in the | Reconciliation of the past; means for Monnet the replacement of past problems by common future initiatives, undertaken by equal partners. (Cf. Inclusiveness)<br><br>For Monnet, the Versailles Treaty was no example for constructive dealing with the past: "It was based on discrimination. (…) I understood that equality is as essential in the contact with other peoples as in the contact with other individuals. An unequal peace could never work. »[ix]<br><br>"Looking back, we see the extraordinary disaster the Europeans have caused themselves, we are literally shocked. Meanwhile, the cause of it is simple: during this century, everybody chased down their own destiny and applied its own rules."[x] |

past, to join our liberation struggle. No man or woman who has abandoned apartheid will be excluded from our movement towards a non-racial united and democratic South Africa, based on one person one vote on a common voters' roll."[vii]

Statement of Mandela on the Bisho Massacre, 7 September 1992: "Those who still wish to cling to a discredited past had their say yesterday. It is evident that they have nothing to offer our country other than continuing violence, conflict and bloodshed. (…) We also want to say loudly and clearly: we have travelled too far along the road to freedom to turn back now. We shall not be deterred by the threats of the actions of the forces of the past. Our people have the right to hope, the right to a future, the right to life itself. No power on this earth can destroy the thirst for human dignity. Our land cries out for peace. We will only achieve it through adherence to democratic principles and respect for the rights of all. This is the challenge that faces all South Africans. We dare not fail."[viii]

| Focus on weaknesses – strengths | |
|---|---|
| **3. Strengths** | |
| The belief that it is possible for human beings to live together in peace is, for Mandela, probably the greatest potential strength which can be found within the society.<br><br>"I never lost hope that this great transformation would occur. (…) Because of the courage of ordinary men and women of my country. I always knew that deep down in every human heart, there was mercy and generosity. No one is born hating another person because of the colour of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite. Even in the grimmest times in prison, when my comrades and I were pushed to our limits, I would see a glimmer of humanity in one of the guards, perhaps just for a second, but it was enough to reassure me and keep me going. Man's goodness is a flame that can be hidden but never extinguished."[xi] | To build the wealthy and peaceful Europe Monnet envisioned, all economies of the participating countries have to merge into one. The private interests are joined together and the production is orchestrated towards the new situation of Europe in a world wherein competition and progression prevail.[xii]<br><br>"While travelling in the United States, a journalist said to me: "that Europe you are creating, results from Soviet pressure!" I told him: "No, Europe is not born out of fear. It's the result of the trust we have in ourselves and of the certainty that if, eventually, the Europeans understand that they have common qualities and capacities, that they will be able to build a western world that will bring an element of security for the civilization as a whole, for peace, for the United States and for Russia."[xiii] |
| **Peace Process** | |
| **4. Inclusive** | |
| Since the mid fifties Nelson Mandela fully embraced the ANC's policy of multi racialism for South Africa as stated in the Freedom Charter: "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people."[xiv]<br><br>The new South Africa had to be build by and for all South Africans. 1990: "We call on our white compatriots to join us in the shaping of a new South Africa. The freedom movement is a political home for | Monnet stressed the importance of gathering former antagonists and all those who want to work together to build a peaceful Europe, on an equal basis.<br><br>« I envisaged only one solution, to unite ourselves irreversibly with Germany in a solidarity based organization wherein other neighbouring countries could join. This would create a European domain of wealth and peace. »[xvii] |

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| you too."[xv]<br><br>The ANC did not cross the two-thirds threshold in the elections. This meant that they were not able to write a constitution unfettered by input from others. Some ANC members were disappointed by this, but Mandela was relieved: "people would argue that we had created an ANC constitution, not a South African constitution. I wanted a true government of national unity."[xvi] | |
| **5. Interests** | |
| During the violent early nineties, Mandela neglected the call for arms by the ANC supporters. He preferred a negotiated deal with the National Party in stead of more violence. The latter would interfere with future reconciliation efforts and Mandela wanted to prevent the white South Africans to leave the country with their companies, investments and know how. Besides this the ANC was well aware that they would never be able to achieve a military victory. | Monnet believed that the satisfaction of human needs and interests is the prime source for committing people to build a common peace.<br><br>« The problem was not to adapt myself to their psychology, nor to let them think like I did, but to invite them to prefer the common interest above their national interest."[xviii]<br><br>Monnet believed that cooperation under a higher authority is the most reasonable solution to common problems. He wanted to persuade by means of reason and not by coercion or authority.<br><br>« When people are threatened by a common danger, you don't treat their interests separately. »[xix]<br><br>Karl Carstens, Former President of the Federal Republic of Germany: "The methods that Jean Monnet used were exceptional. By means of long, insistent discussions, he attempted to persuade the main political figures of the European countries of the accuracy of his objective. He never used pressure, he trusted in the strength of his arguments."[xx] |
| **6. Confrontation** | |
| Nelson Mandela challenged the status quo not only on the level of the government but also within his own ANC. He was one of | Monnet did not try to avoid latent problems. In his autobiography he characterized his style of thinking as American : « [the |

the co founders of the ANC Youth League which gave a new impulse to the ANC, he was the man within the ANC to plea for armed struggle, and co founded the Umkhonto we Sizwe, and during his last years in prison he took the isolated decision to start negotiations with the South African government.

"There are times when a leader must move ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way."[xxi]

Mandela and the ANC opted for constructive confrontation. They tried to consider the consequences of their actions in the light of a future reconciliation: "We of the ANC had always stood for a non-racial democracy, and we shrank from any action which might drive the races further apart than they already were."[xxii]

Americans] were never afraid to consider what is necessary before they ask themselves whether it is possible. A priori, what is necessary has to be possible. »[xxiii]

This can be illustrated by the initiatives Monnet undertook at the eve of the Second World War. Unlike other politicians, he was not misled by Hitler's appeasing manoeuvres. In stead of covering up the threats of a future war, Monnet warned that the European democracies would lose the war if they didn't prepare their armies for war. On behalf of France Monnet negotiated with the USA for the purchase of fighter planes (which were used by the RAF); and tried to establish the union of France and the U.K. in order to keep the French government on the side of the allies.[xxiv]

Sir Edward Heath, Former British Prime Minister : "The secret of his influence lay in his ability to identify decision makers, at whatever level they were. That done, the force of his arguments as much as the simplicity of his eloquence persuaded them to support his ideas and to assure him that they would be put into practice."[xxv]

## 7.Time

Mandela was sensitive for timing. He objected strongly to the "Freedom in 1963" campaign of the PAC, because they promised a free South Africa within an unrealistic time span. When he met the PAC leader Robert Sobukwe a couple of months later on Robben Island, Mandela said: "My brother, there is nothing so dangerous as a leader making a demand that he knows that cannot be achieved. It creates false hopes among the people."[xxvi]

Another example of Mandela's sensitivity for timing can be found during the ANC election campaign: "Just as we told the people what we would do, I felt we must also tell them what we could not do. Many

In stead of raising doubt and distrust by confronting people with sudden change, Monnet preferred to let the stakeholders clarify their common goal and to present them a moderate yet structured transition process. He was convinced of the stimulating power of time schedules and step by step progression.[xxviii]

people felt life would change overnight after a free and democratic election, but that would be far from the case."[xxvii]

## 8. Understand

Mandela was very straightforward during negotiations with president de Klerk. He knew what he wanted to obtain for the black, coloured and Indian people of South Africa. On the other hand, he had shown a refined understanding of the fears of the white population.

"Two central issues need to be addressed: firstly, the demand for majority rule in a unitary state; secondly, the concern of white South Africans over this demand, as well as the insistence of whites on structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean domination of the white minority by blacks."[xxix]

Mandela's understanding of the conflicting party and his empathy with the oppressor is extraordinary. He even believed that that the Apartheid regime took away the freedom of the oppressor: "It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity."[xxx]

He showed magnanimity in understanding the feelings of the white South Africans regarding the formation of a multi-racial democracy: "A number of obstacles to the

creation of a non-racial democratic South Africa remain and need to be tackled. The fears of whites about their rights and place in a South Africa they do not control exclusively are an obstacle we must understand and address. I stated in 1964 that I and the ANC are as opposed to black domination as we are to white domination. We must accept however that our statements and declarations alone will not be sufficient to allay the fears of white South Africans. We must clearly demonstrate our goodwill to our white compatriots and convince them by our conduct and arguments that a South Africa without apartheid will be a better home for all."[xxxi]

### Essential peace building blocks

### 9. Comprehensive

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| Free and democratic elections is not enough for Mandela to build peace on the ruins of the apartheid state. He pays attention to: justice, peace, sexual and racial equality, social security, the refugee problem, ecology, and reconciliation.<br><br>"We live with the hope that as she battles to remake herself, South Africa will be like a microcosm of the new world that is striving to be born. This must be a world of democracy and respect for human rights, a world freed from the horrors of poverty, hunger, deprivation and ignorance, relieved of the threat and the scourge of civil wars and external aggression and unburdened of the great tragedy of millions forced to become refugees. The processes in which South Africa and Southern Africa as a whole are engaged, beckon and urge us all that we take this tide at the flood and make of this region a living example of what all people of conscience would like the world to be. The normal condition for human existence is democracy, justice, peace, non- | Throughout his life and work, Monnet comprehended the strive for peace, economical wealth, political liberties and the social unification of people. |

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| racism, non-sexism, prosperity for everybody, a healthy environment and equality and solidarity among the peoples."[xxxii] | |

### 10. Structures

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| | For Monnet, institutions are a conditio sine qua non for sustainable peace building. Good intentions have to be translated in good functioning institutions.<br><br>« Did I make it sufficiently clear that the Community we have created is not an end in itself ? It is a process of transformation. (…) While living in separate states in the past, the people of Europe will have to learn to live together under freely consented rules and institutions, if they want to obtain the necessary dimensions for their progress and if they want to stay in control of their proper destiny. The sovereign nation states of the past provide us no longer the format wherein we can resolve the problems of the present. »[xxxiii]<br><br>"There will be no peace in Europe (…) as long as the nations organize themselves again on the basis of their national sovereignty, with the politics of prestige and economical protection it entails. If the European countries will protect themselves once again from one another, the creation of vast armies will be necessary once more."[xxxiv]<br><br>"Nothing is possible without human beings, nothing is sustainable without institutions."[xxxv]<br><br>"This European Union can't be based merely on good will. Rules are necessary. The tragic events we've lived through, (…) may have rendered ourselves more wise. But people go by and others will come to replace us. What we can give them is not our personal experience. It will disappear with us. We can give them institutions. The live of institutions is much longer than that |

| | of men, and institutions can, if they are constructed well, accumulate and pass on the wisdom of many generations."ˣˣˣᵛⁱ |
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| 11. Socio-economic | |
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| The ANC was (and is still) linked with the South African Communist party. But this does not mean that the ANC adopted the communist economic ideology. As far as Mandela is concerned, there have been periods where he embraced communism, but became more in favour of a socialist economy. As president he saw the need to make a clear cut choice for a liberal economy in order to reassure both local enterprises, and foreign investors.<br><br>Mandela: "My approach was not ideological, but it was biased in favour of socialism, which I saw as the most advanced stage of economic life then evolved by man."ˣˣˣᵛⁱⁱ<br><br>1956: "Whilst the [Freedom] Charter proclaims democratic changes of a far-reaching nature it is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state but a program for the unification of various classes and groupings amongst the people on a democratic basis. (…) The Charter's declaration "The People Shall Govern" visualizes the transfer of power not to any single social class but to all the people of this country be they workers, peasants, professional men or petty-bourgeoisie."ˣˣˣᵛⁱⁱⁱ<br><br>1964: "The ideological creed of the ANC is, and always has been the creed of African Nationalism. (…) The most important political document ever adopted by the ANC is the Freedom Charter. It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state. It calls for redistribution, but not nationalization.(…) The ANC has never at any period of its history advocated a revolutionary change in the economic | Monnet wanted to stimulate the economic revival of Europe after the Second World War by means of economic cooperation of the different nations in strong overarching structures as the ECSC, EURATOM and the EEC.<br><br>"I learned that (…) economical phenomena are no blind forces, but that they could be measured and directed. True power rules where organization reigns."ˣˡ |

| structure of the country, nor has it, to the best of my recollection ever condemned capitalist society.(…) The Communist Party sought to emphasize class distinctions whilst the ANC seeks to harmonize them.(…) Today I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation."ˣˣˣⁱˣ | |
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| 12. Democracy | |
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| As stated under 'future', the main objective of Nelson Mandela was a non-racial democracy.<br><br>1955: "Only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief.<br><br>Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate for all bodies which make laws."ˣˡⁱ<br><br>When Mandela became president, he and his government of national unity were confronted with a lot of transition problems. There was for example a great lack of skilled and experienced black and coloured civil servants. | |

| 13. Senti-mental walls | |
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| Mandela acquired an aura of holiness for his reconciling efforts. After 27 years in prison Mandela devoted much of his time to reconcile the peoples of South Africa. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was but one of his efforts to reconcile the peoples of South Africa.<br><br>"The critical act of reconciliation, …, is the | Reluctant to focus on the differences and the causes of the hatred between France and Germany, Monnet chose to stress the possible future they could have in common. He hoped that this vision would provide people with hope and courage to embrace the common future: "This war that lived in the minds, has to be conquered with the arms of the imagination."ˣˡⁱⁱⁱ |

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| dismantling of what remains of apartheid practices and attitudes. Reconciliation without this major step, will be transient, the ode of false hope on the lips of fools. It will therefore be critical, that when we go into the detail of the TRC [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] report's recommendations in the coming period, we must elaborate concrete plans about how together we can make practical contributions. This applies particularly to reparations, not so much to individuals, but to communities and the nation as a whole."[xlii] | |

### 14. Network of peace building leadership

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| The ANC has a tradition of collective leadership. Nelson Mandela was pushed forward as the symbol of the struggle against apartheid, and this gave him a lot of power, but most of the time it was the collective that directed the struggle.<br><br>"I come from a long tradition of collective leadership, consultative decision-making and joint action towards the common good. We have overcome much that many thought insurmountable through an adherence to those practices."[xliv]<br><br>Yet at several occasions Nelson Mandela was criticized by other members of the ANC leadership for defying these norms of collective leadership. | Monnet had a special eye for the right man he had to contact and enjoyed a large network of influential people.<br><br>Sir Edward Heath, Former British Prime Minister: "The secret of his influence lay in his ability to identify decision makers, at whatever level they were. That done, the force of his arguments as much as the simplicity of his eloquence persuaded them to support his ideas and to assure him that they would be put into practice."[xlv] |

### 15. External relations

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| Much of the ANC's success in the struggle against apartheid lies in the fact that they had a network of external partners that brought the excesses of the regime on the international agenda. | Solid external relations formed the crux of Monnet's peace building approach.<br><br>"I never believed in isolated action, but in collective effort."[xlvi]<br><br>"Our collaborators came from six countries and very soon they formed a team without distinction in nationality, looking for common solutions for common problems."[xlvii] |

### 16. Flexible

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| Although he could be very stubborn, Nelson Mandela was no fundamentalist. He changed ideologically form extreme Africanism[xlviii] to multi racialism and from communism to socialism. His ideas on pacifism or armed struggle were led by pragmatic reasoning in stead of principles. were , and from freedom fighter to man of peace.<br><br>Joe Matthews: "This [flexibility] has been an ANC characteristic for years. One of the reasons for the survival of the ANC over such a long period, is their ability to steal other people's programs, and to adapt to situations. As extraordinary adaptation to a policy which previously they opposed, and then they realize its merits, and then adjust and it comes out as a different policy. (...) I think it's wrong to ascribe this to Mandela alone."[xlix] | Monnet's mind is oriented towards the future where almost anything is possible: "When there are no examples present, you have to invent the organization forms you need."[l] |

### Mindset

### 17. Creative tension

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| Mandela proved capable to adapt to different kinds of situations. He fought the apartheid regime from the bar as a lawyer, he organized demonstrations for the ANC both before and after the organization was outlawed, faced ban orders and spent long months in custody. He was commander-in-chief of the Umkhonto we Sizwe, spent 27 years of his life in prison, acted as the spokesperson of the non white people of South Africa during the negotiations and reorganized his country as he became the first black president of South Africa. He proved capable to adapt to every situation, and regardless his place or position kept on fighting for the freedom of South Africa. | The construction of the European Union was a difficult process. Jean Monnet considered crises and problems as inevitable because they precede and announce desired change.[li]<br><br>Monnet liked to quote Ibn Saud: "For me, everything can be a means, even the obstacle."[lii]<br><br>"When the moment arrives, all is simple, because the necessity allows no room for hesitation."[liii]<br><br>René Pleven, former President of the Council: "If he is one of the great men who have marked our time, it is not only because of his extraordinary clairvoyance and the sureness of his judgment. It was because of his indomitable will not to be subjected to events. He never resigned himself to the |

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| idea that a problem, however difficult, could not be resolved."[liv] | |
| **Use of force** | |
| **18. Force** | |
| Not only in South Africa, but also on the international forum, Mandela was for a long time considered as a terrorist and not a freedom fighter. He was the man within the ANC who decided to take up arms and founded the Umkhonto we Sizwe. Mandela gave two reasons for taking this turn: | Monnet was strictly speaking not a pacifist. He approved the use of arms to "defend liberty against totalitarianism."[lviii] He was actively involved during the two World Wars and pleaded for the establishment of a European Defence Community to overcome the problem of the German army.[lix] During the First World War, Monnet pleaded for the union of France and the U.K.[lx] And he successfully persuaded president Roosevelt to discard the neutrality of the U.S.A. in order to raise the arms production. |
| 1) He took a very pragmatic stance on the question of non violence, for him, the means have to be in harmony with the situation. For him, the use of non violent action an defiance (boycott, strikes, civil disobedience, non cooperation, etc.) proved to be as inefficient as the petitions used during the first three decennia of the existence of the ANC. The government used more and more force to crush every opposition. | |
| "Over and over again, we had used all the non-violent weapons in our arsenal – speeches, deputations, threats, marches, strikes, stay-aways, voluntary imprisonment – all of no avail, for whatever we did was met by an iron hand. A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor. At a certain point one can only fight fire with fire."[lv] | |
| 2) Mandela's second argument use violence was that the call for violent struggle was growing louder and louder. For Mandela, it was inadmissible that other organizations than the ANC would take the lead in the violent struggle. He wanted to take the lead in order to control it. | |
| "Violence would begin whether we | |

initiated it or not. If we didn't take the lead now, we soon would be latecomers and followers in a movement we did not control."[lvi]

During the Rivonia trial in 1964, Mandela defended the use of violence:

"The ANC heritage of non-violence and racial harmony was very much with us. We felt that the country was drifting towards a civil war in which Blacks and Whites would fight each other. We viewed the situation with alarm. Civil war could mean the destruction of what the ANC stood for; with civil war, racial peace would be more difficult than ever to achieve. (...) The avoidance of civil war had dominated our thinking for many years, but when we decided to adopt violence as part of our policy, we realized that we might one day have to face the prospect of such a war. This had to be taken into account in formulation our plans. (...) Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision. In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. (...)[lvii]

Defending the founding of Umkhonto we Sizwe:

"Firstly, we believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable and that unless responsible leadership was given to canalize and control the feelings of our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of this country which is not

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| produced even by war. | |
| Secondly, we felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful modes of expressing opposition to this principle had been closed by legislation, and we were placed in a position in which we had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority, or to defy the Government. We chose to defy the law. We first broke the law in a way which voided any recourse to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the Government resorted to show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did we decide to answer violence with violence. | |
| But the violence we chose to adopt was not terrorism." | |

### 19. Security

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| | When the question about the rearmament of Germany was raised during the Korean War, Monnet proposed to establish a European Army: the European Defence Commission. |

### Ethical concerns

### 20. Realist

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| Mandela accepted that you can't realize all your wishes in politics:<br><br>"In politics, no matter how much one plans, circumstances often dictate events."[lxi] | Monnet was both a realist and an idealist. Only when the goal was clearly defined, he turned to the present conflict situation. In his *Mémoires* Monnet wrote that this "American" style often met with a lot of resistance. For example when he negotiated the increase of arms production in the U.K and the U.S.A. during the Second World War: « [This] implicated a revolution in mindset for the English, but not for the Americans, where one is never afraid to consider what is needed before asking oneself what is possible. A priori, what is |

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| | necessary has to be possible. »[lxii] |

### 21. Ethics

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| An example of Mandela's weighing of principles and their outcome can be found in his attitude towards non violence. It was only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful protest had been barred, that the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle, and to form Umkhonto we Sizwe.<br><br>"I saw non-violence on the Gandhian model not as an inviolable principle but as a tactic to be used as the situation demanded. The principle was not so important that the strategy should be used even when it was self-defeating, as Gandhi himself believed. I called for non-violent protest for as long as it was effective."[lxiii] | The previous hypothesis makes clear that Monnet's realization of his plans was as important as his intentions. |

### 22. Definition of peace

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| Cf. 9. | Peace, for Monnet, comprehends more than the absence of violence: it also entails economical wealth, political liberty, and the unification of people. |

### 23. Definition of violence

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| Cf. 9. | |

### 24. Human security

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| Cf. 9. | Cf. 11. |

### Personal characteristics

### 25. Servants

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| Mandela sacrificed his personal freedom, happiness and safety to that of his people. As a member of the ANC, Mandela didn't always agree with the party policy.<br><br>Joe Matthews recalls: "… even when he didn't hold office, Mandela always came forward and presented himself as a leading | As the man behind the scene Monnet was the great facilitator of the genesis of the European Union. Cf. 25. |

figure in the ANC. He ignored office as the criterion of leadership and very often he did and said things which should have been said by those who held office."[lxiv]

"I have always believed that to be a freedom fighter one must suppress many of the personal feelings that make one feel like a separate individual rather than part of a mass movement. One is fighting for the liberation of millions of people, not the glory of one individual. I am not suggesting that man become a robot and rid himself of all personal feelings and motivations. But in the same way that a freedom fighter subordinates his own family to the family of the people, he must subordinate his own feelings to the movement."[lxv]

Former President Frederik W. de Klerk: "I got to know him as a very good listener, as a man with a legal mind, with analytical thinking patterns taking into account all facts. Coming forth, generally speaking, with reasonable replies and reactions towards requests, towards suggestions. Solution orientated. When arguing against certain proposals, saying, "But something else could be considered." So he was a good negotiator. I also got to know him quite soon as an astute politician. (…) The longer we knew each other, I also got to know another side of his character. That he could be, on occasion, extremely stubborn. That he could, from my vantage point, at times, get unreasonable. That he could lose his temper and then be quite fierce and quite a different person."[lxvi]

## 26. Populist

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| Mandela enjoyed enormous popularity. The slogan "Free Nelson Mandela" stood for so much as "Free South-Africa". Although he was not always happy with the myth they created round his person, he was able to use his popularity for the common good. This allowed him to become the president of | Monnet was as a leader of leaders, who remained relatively unknown to the public. This 'unpopularity' was not due to a timid personality. He preferred to work behind the scenes and granted all success and fame to others. The advantage of working behind the scene is that he didn't have to deal with |

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| (almost) all South Africans.<br><br>"I told our supporters, 'Life will not change dramatically, except that you will have increased your self esteem and become a citizen in your own land. You must have patience. You might have to wait five years for results to show'. I challenged them; I did not patronize them: 'If you want to continue living in poverty without clothes and food,' I told them, 'then go and drink in the shebeens. But if you want better things, you must work hard. We cannot do it all for you; you must do it yourselves."[lxvii]<br><br>He was the motor of reconciliation and encouraged others to join him in the realization of a unified South Africa.<br><br>"Those who thrive on hatred destroy their own capacity to make a positive contribution."[lxviii] | the short term problems.<br><br>"Because they bear the risks, they need the laurels. In my work you have to forget about the laurels. I do not have a particular preference for the shade, but if it is better for the efficiency, I prefer to stay in the shade."[lxix]<br><br>He was able to inspire people to work on common solutions.<br><br>"When people are gathered around the same table to talk about the same problem and work together to find a solution, their mentality changes and the opposition erases."[lxx] |

## 27. Integrity

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| Mandela's dignity and style are renowned. He treats others with much respect and expects to be treated likewise. | Monnet was renowned for his personal integrity. He liked to quote Dwight Morrow: "There are two kinds of people: those who want to be important, and those who want to do something important."[lxxi]<br><br>Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany: "He listened only to his conscience, his sense of politically necessary and salutary actions; his highly developed responsibility as a citizen of the world went far beyond the national framework. Monnet was a rare; I would even be tempted to say unique, political man who succeeded in carrying out his work without the essential factor of politics which is power. »[lxxii] |

| 28. Courageous | |
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| Mandela's courage is undeniable. He faced a fearsome and powerful enemy, and risked not only his freedom and security, but also his life.<br><br>"I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die."[lxxiii]<br><br>Mandela and the other leaders who stood on trial for treason, agreed not to appeal regardless the verdict of the court.<br><br>"We had from the first maintained that what we had done, we had done proudly and for moral reasons. We were not now going to suggest otherwise in an appeal. If a death sentence was passed, we did not want to hamper the mass campaign that would surely spring up. In light of the bold and defiant line we had taken all along, an appeal would seem anti-climatic and even disillusioning. Our message was that no sacrifice was too great in the struggle for freedom."[lxxiv]<br><br>"The brave man is not he who does not feel afraid, but he who conquers that fear."[lxxv] | "Optimism is not a feature of my character. I am only determined. Can one say, for example, that something is impossible when one didn't even try it?"[lxxvi]<br><br>"When one is determined regarding the goal one wants to obtain, you have to go for it without contemplating the risks of failure. As long as you haven't tried, you can't say that something is impossible."[lxxvii]<br><br>"Nothing is never lost, except when you are dead."[lxxviii]<br><br>Monnet, retired, wrote: "My friends come to see me and ask what to do. I answer them: "Go on, go on, for the people of Europe there's no other future than the union."[lxxix] |

| 29. Trust | |
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| Mandela always had a lot of confidence in the future and was able to radiate this trust towards others. | For Monnet, trust building was essential to let people consider their common interests.<br><br>« Creating confidence is much simpler than one believes; it is precisely through simplicity that one achieves it. When delegates were very suspicious, they gradually noticed that we didn't have anything to hide. »[lxxx]<br><br>« I had to rely on the intelligence and the good will that exist in every decent man and which comes about when confidence is created. »[lxxxi] |

| 30. Vocation | |
|---|---|
| Nelson Mandela came from a royal family and was raised to become the advisor of the Thembu king. Later on his ideal was to become a good civil servant, but during his studies he got confronted with the humiliations the black people had to bare, and he saw it as his duty to fight for the freedom of his people. | Monnet was driven by a will to unify peoples, not nations.<br><br>« I always followed the same way in all circumstances (…) to unify people, deal with the problems that divide them and direct them to their common interest. (…) I always was attracted by unity and collective action. »[lxxxii] |

| 31. Capable | |
|---|---|
| When he was put in solitary confinement, Mandela saw a window of opportunity to start secret negotiations with the South African government. He considered himself the man in place to make this move. | Monnet never aspired higher education, but saw himself as capable and had seized every opportunity to realize the plans he designed.<br><br>"I never liked to go to school. I refused, or some problem obstructed me to learn by heart, to learn a 'knowledge of books.'"[lxxxiii]<br><br>He strove to teach himself the art of negotiation, which meant for Monnet to enrich his 'experience of man'.[lxxxiv] |

## 7. Empowerment of Peace building leadership

With respect to handling spoilers the challenge is to weaken their spoiling behaviour. With respect to peace builders we have to find ways and means for empowerment.

The impact of PBL can be strengthened by levelling the field and by training and education. The field can be levelled by embedding the conflict in a democratic environment and/or by providing support during the peace negotiation process. Peace building leadership can also be strengthened through training and education workshops.' Self help workshops ' for leaders and their advisors from different transition and developing countries, where experiences and lessons learned are exchanged and inputs can be provided by researchers, could be a useful education tool.

## 8. Conclusions

To research the characteristics of peace architects, such as Jean Monnet or Nelson Mandela, more systematically would significantly contribute to more effective peace building. It would not only help to identify and strengthen the peace building potential, but also to track and weaken the spoilers in the peace building process. It would also help to get rid of some of the stereotypical images of peace builders, such as the image of peace builders as pacifists. They are not pacifists, but practical peace builders. They do not only construct, but also need to deconstruct. They do not kill enemies, but try to turn them into allies.. They cut through dogmas, taboos, doctrines, etiquette, cynicism and others sentimental obstacles on the way to progress. Monnet challenged the ideas of political prestige and economic protectionism; he pleaded for supra nationalism; and questioned the belief in 'archenemies' or the existence of a politically independent economic sphere. He was a professional with a cause.

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